Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Insurance Law by Cuthbertson, J. Douglas
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 35 | Issue 3 Article 10
2001
Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Insurance Law
J. Douglas Cuthbertson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Insurance Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. D. Cuthbertson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Insurance Law, 35 U. Rich. L. Rev. 697 (2001).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss3/10
INSURANCE LAW
J. Douglas Cuthbertson *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses judicial decisions and various legislation
that have affected the law of insurance in Virginia since June 1,
2000.1 As in years past, most of the changes have taken place in
the area of uninsured/underinsured motorist ('"JAVUIM") insur-
ance coverage. This article will discuss these developments as
well as those in other areas of insurance law-specifically, those
pertaining to agents, coverage, the insurer's duty to defend, fire
insurance, life insurance, misrepresentation, and waiver and es-
toppel.
II. AGENTS
In American Spirit Insurance Co. v. Owens,2 the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered whether an insurance company
could recover its attorney's fees and other expenses related to
claims made on a policy issued by its agent in breach of the
agency agreement.3
The agent accepted an insurance application on a house that he
knew was in a dilapidated state, relying on the owner's represen-
• Associate, Miles & Stockbridge P.C., McLean, Virginia. B.A-, 1993, University of
Richmond; J.D., 1997, University of Houston Law Center.
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1. Health, accident, and sickness insurance are not discussed. This article discusses
only those statutory changes that are likely to impact insurance practitioners.
2. 261 Va. 270, 541 S.E.2d 553 (2001).
3. Id. at 273, 541 S.E.2d at 553-54.
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tation that it was being renovated.4 The agent valued the struc-
ture and its contents based solely on these representations.
Later, the agent admitted that the market value of the property
"wasn't very high" and that the structure did not comply with the
insurance company's underwriting guidelines.6 Less than one
month later, the property was destroyed by fire.7 The insurer de-
nied the owner's claims under the policy because it determined
that he set the fire and that he made material misstatements on
his application.8
The owner and his wife sued the insurer for breach of contract.9
The jury found that, while the owner did indeed set the fire and
make false statements on his application, his wife was a resident
of the house as defined by the policy, and thus was entitled to re-
cover.1" The case was later settled." The company then sued its
agent seeking indemnity for its costs. 2 The trial court awarded
the company the amount that it incurred to settle the case as well
as legal fees associated with the investigation of the claim, but
not attorney's fees and costs incurred in the litigation on the pol-
icy.13
The supreme court reversed, holding that American Spirit was
entitled to indemnity for all of its costs. 4 The court found nothing
ambiguous in the terms of the agency agreement.15 Paragraph
four provided indemnification for "any liabilities" that the com-
pany incurred as a result of the agent's breach. 16 No express term
of the agreement excluded from that indemnity "'reasonable at-
torney's fees and expenses of litigation spent in defense of the
claim indemnified against.""'
4. Id. at 273, 541 S.E.2d at 554.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 273-74, 541 S.E.2d at 554.
9. Id. at 274, 541 S.E.2d at 554.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 274, 541 S.E.2d at 555.
14. Id. at 277, 541 S.E.2d at 556.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (quoting S. Ry. Co. v. Arlen Realty, 220 Va. 291, 296, 257 S.E.2d 841, 844
(1979)). Regarding express indemnification agreements, the court adopted
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III. COVERAGE
A. Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided two cases dealing with
insurance coverage in June 2000. The first, Partnership Um-
brella, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.,"8 was a declaratory judg-
ment action over a director's liability policy. 9
Partnership Umbrella, a Virginia corporation affiliated with
the United Way, had an executive liability and indemnification
insurance policy with Federal.2 ° A director of the company, an
"insured person" under the policy, told Federal that the charity
and federal prosecutors might sue him.21 Federal declined cover-
age, concluding that a claim did not exist.22 During the following
two years, the corporation authorized advances in excess of
"the rule followed in the great majority of other jurisdictions... that the in-
demnitee may recover reasonable attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
spent in defense of the claim indemnified against." The indemnitee's right to
recover is based upon the express terms of the contract, and where "no provi-
sion of the contract provides otherwise," that right extends to any expense
reasonably incurred as a result of the breach, including the proper legal costs
and expenses incurred in defending an indemnified claim made by a third
party against the indemnitee.
Id. at 275, 541 S.E.2d at 555 (quotingArlen Realty, 220 Va. at 296, 257 S.E.2d at 844).
18. 260 Va. 123,530 S.E.2d 154(2000).
19. Id. at 125, 530 S.E.2d at 155.
20. Id. at 126, 530 S.E.2d at 155. The policy provided two forms of coverage. Id. Ac-
cording to "Insuring Clause 1," Federal was required under the "Executive Liability Cov-
erage" to
pay on behalf of each of the Insured Persons all Loss for which the Insured
Person is not indemnified by the Insured Organization and which the Insured
Person becomes legally obligated to pay on account of any claim first made
against him, individually or otherwise.., for a Wrongful Act committed, at-
tempted, or allegedly committed or attempted, by the Insured Person(s) be-
fore or during the Policy Period.
Id. "Insuring Clause 2" contained "Executive Indemnification Coverage," which obligated
Federal to
pay on behalf of the Insured Organization all Loss for which the Insured Or-
ganization grants indemnification to each Insured Person, as permitted or
required by law, which the Insured Person has become legally obligated to
pay on account of any claim first made against him, individually or other-
wise... for a Wrongful Act committed, attempted, or allegedly committed or
attempted, by such Insured Person(s) before or during the Policy Period.
Id.
21. Id. at 127, 530 S.E.2d at 156.
22. Id.
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$300,000 to cover his legal expenses, but additional fees were still
owed.2 3 When the U.S. Attorney notified the director by letter
that he was a target of a grand jury investigation, Federal still
declined to provide coverage.24 The director was later convicted on
eight counts of fraud, conspiracy, and tax violations. 5 Partner-
ship Umbrella approved a formal resolution of indemnification for
his legal fees and expenses from the date of the target letter on-
ward.26
Federal determined that the indemnification was illegal under
Virginia law and filed for a declaratory judgment seeking to avoid
liability under the policy.27 Partnership Umbrella counterclaimed
for breach of contract, seeking to recover the money that it had
advanced for legal expenses and that it had agreed to pay as in-
demnity.2
The court held that, under "Insuring Clause 1," the director
could recover both the expenses that he incurred and those for
which he was not indemnified. 29 Further, Partnership Umbrella
could recover the advances that it made to the director and could
enforce the policy on his behalf with respect to monies still "due
and owing." ° The court's rationale was that the advances and the
amounts owing did not constitute indemnification, so the director
remained "legally obligated to pay" those expenses. 3' The court
also ruled that if Partnership Umbrella's decision to indemnify
was found to be invalid or unlawful, Partnership Umbrella could
not recover the money it paid as indemnification under Insuring
Clause 1.32
B. Property Insurance
In Lower Chesapeake Associates v. Valley Forge Insurance Co. ,3
23. Id. at 128, 530 S.E.2d at 156.
24. Id. at 128, 530 S.E.2d at 157.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 129, 530 S.E.2d at 157.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 134, 530 S.E.2d at 160.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 133-34, 530 S.E.2d at 160.
32. Id. at 135, 530 S.E.2d at 161.
33. 260 Va. 77, 532 S.E.2d 325 (2000).
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the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether a commercial
marina could recover against its property insurer for damage
done to its floating docks during a hurricane. 4 At trial, the dock
master testified that all of the docks were damaged by the hurri-
cane." An expert witness estimated the cost of repairing all of the
docks, but admitted that he could not tell whether some of the
damage had been caused by an earlier storm.36 Other evidence
showed that rot and poor maintenance had caused some of the
damage.37
The trial court found that one dock that had collapsed due to
the "windstorm" and "water damage" was a covered loss.38 It
found that the damage to the other docks, however, resulted from
excluded causes, and those docks did not suffer "collapses."9 The
trial court entered judgment for the marina for the damage to the
one collapsed dock in the amount of $500,000.40
The term "collapse" was not defined in the policy, so the su-
preme court gave it its ordinary and accepted meaning.4 The trial
court said that it did not use "a dictionary definition" of that term
but instead reviewed photographs and other evidence to conclude
that the damage to one of the docks was "what the policy meant
when it sa[id] collapse."42 The supreme court held that the trial
court properly applied the ordinary and accepted meaning of "col-
lapse" in reaching its conclusion and that the decision was not
plainly wrong or without evidentiary support.
The court also found that the evidence supported the trial
court's finding that the other docks were damaged by wind-driven
water and gradual deterioration, which were excluded causes un-
der the policy.4 However, the policy's exclusions did not defeat its
"collapse" coverage provisions because the policy was ambiguous
34. Id. at 79, 532 S.E.2d at 326.
35. Id. at 80, 532 S.E.2d at 327.
36. Id. at 81-82, 532 S.E.2d at 328.
37. Id. at 82, 532 S.E.2d at 328.
38. Id. at 85, 532 S.E.2d at 330.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 86, 532 S.E.2d at 330.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 86, 532 S.E.2d at 331.
44. Id. at 87, 532 S.E.2d at 331.
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and would be construed in favor of providing coverage.45 Finally,
the supreme court set aside the trial court's award of damages,
finding that the evidence did not support the amount of damages
awarded.46
The supreme court's ruling in this case is significant because it
demonstrates that a trial court does not have to determine the
"ordinary and accepted" meaning of an undefined policy term in
deciding whether coverage exists under that provision. It is suffi-
cient if, when construing undefined terms, the trial court's con-
clusion of "what the policy meant" is supported by the evidence.
IV. DUTY TO DEFEND
In Morrow Corp. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co.,47 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
considered the issue of an insurer's duty to defend.4" The case in-
volved a coverage dispute between two insurers, Harleysville and
Sentry Insurance Company, and Morrow, who operated a "plant-
on-premises" dry-cleaning business in a shopping center from
1986 until 1996.49 During this time, the plaintiffs had several dif-
ferent comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policies
that provided different coverage for pollution damage."
The policies fell into three categories: (1) "those containing an
'absolute pollution exclusion,"' without an exception for sudden
and accidental discharges;5' (2) "those containing a pollution ex-
clusion with an exception for 'sudden and accidental' discharges
of pollutants ... ;52 and (3) "those containing pollution liability
insurance."53
45. Id. at 88-89, 532 S.E.2d at 332.
46. Id. at 89, 532 S.E.2d at 332.
47. 101 F. Supp. 2d 422 (E.D. Va. 2000), motion to amend denied, 110 F. Supp. 2d 441
(E.D. Va. 2000).
48. Id. at 424.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 425. A Harleysville policy, in effect from May 1986 to May 1987, contained
a coverage exclusion for "bodily injury or property damage arising from 'the actual or
threatened discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of pollutants.'" Id. Two Sentry policies
in effect from May 1989 through December 1990 also contained this exclusion. Id. at 424-
25.
52. Id. at 425. Two Sentry policies in effect from May 1987 to May 1989 provided cov-
INSURANCE LAW
In their business, Morrow used a solvent containing the toxic
chemical perchloroethylene ("PCE"), which, when released into
the environment, breaks down into another hazardous chemical.54
In 1996, as part of the sale of the shopping center, a site examina-
tion revealed PCE contamination in the soil and groundwater un-
der Morrow's business.5 Under the sales contract, the seller of
the mall bore all costs for the inspection and remediation of the
contamination.5
The seller then sued Morrow, seeking damages and injunctive
relief requiring them to remedy, or bear the costs of remedying,
the contamination. 7 Morrow sought a defense and indemnifica-
tion under their policies.5" Both insurers, however, refused to in-
demnify, or even to defend, based on the various pollution exclu-
sions in the policies. 9 Morrow settled the case with the sellers,
then sued the insurers for declaratory relief and breach of con-
tract.6 °
The court held that the first category of policies, those contain-
ing an "absolute pollution exclusion," were clear and unambigu-
ous.6' Because they did not provide coverage for any damage re-
sulting from pollution, the insurers did not have any duty to
defend.62 The second group, those with a "sudden and accidental"
erage for "sudden and accidental" discharges or releases of pollutants. Id. at 424.
53. Id. at 425. The Sentry policies in effect from May 1991 through May 1995 included
coverage for dry-cleaning businesses, entitled "Pollution Liability Insurance." Id. Accord-
ing to this provision, the policies covered bodily injury or property damage arising from
'the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants.'"
Id. This provision, however, excluded from coverage "'any loss, cost or expense arising
from any direction or request that you [the insured] test for, monitor, clean up, remove,
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 426.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 428.
62. Id. The question remained whether Sentry, since it had a duty to defend under its
other policies, had to bear the entire cost of defense, or whether Morrow would have to pay
for that portion attributable to this uncovered period. Id. at 429. The majority rule, which
the court predicted that Virginia would adopt, was that "when 'there is no reasonable
means of prorating the costs of defense between the covered and the not-covered' periods,
the insurer must bear the entire cost of the defense." Id. (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1224 (6th Cir. 1980)).
2001]
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exception, might have provided coverage because the underlying
complaint included allegations that were broad enough to cover
both sudden and accidental releases." Consequently, Sentry had
a duty to defend under these policies.6" Finally, the third group of
policies providing "Dry Cleaners Additional Coverage" specifically
provided coverage for injury or property damage arising from the
discharge or release of pollutants.65 Thus, Sentry had a duty to
defend under these policies as well.66
Sentry also argued that it had no duty to defend Morrow be-
cause the underlying suit was an action for reimbursement or
restitution, not for "damages" within the scope of any of its poli-
cies.6' There was no Virginia law on this issue, but the court
adopted the view that environmental remediation costs constitute
damages within the meaning of a CGL policy.68 Because the re-
cord was not sufficiently developed, the court declined to decide
the amount of Morrow's award and whether any defense costs at-
tributable to non-covered periods may have been apportioned to
them.69
Sentry later moved to amend the opinion,7 ° because the policies
in effect from 1991 through 1995 required an "occurrence" of bod-
ily injury or property damage to trigger coverage.7' "Occurrence"
was defined as "the date on which bodily injury or property dam-
age first manifests itself."7 2 Therefore, whether the policies, and
Sentry's duty to defend, were triggered depended on when the oc-
currence "first manifested itself.""
63. Id. at 431-32. Noting that the Supreme Court of Virginia had not previously ad-
dressed the meaning of"sudden and accidental," the fact that most courts that had done so
had concluded that "sudden" "add[ed] a temporal component to the exception" weighed
heavily with the court. Id. at 430 (citations omitted). The court adopted this construction,
saying that it was the most accurate since it gave effect to both words in the phrase. Id. at
431.
64. Id. at 431-32.
65. Id. at 432.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 433.
68. Id. at 434.
69. Id. at 435. For the same reason, the court also denied summary judgment on the
issue of Sentry's duty to indemnify Morrow. Id.
70. Morrow Corp. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 110 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D. Va. 2000).
71. Id. at 444-45.
72. Id. at 445.
73. Id. at 446.
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The court gave the term "manifest" its plain meaning in the
context of hazardous chemical pollution. 4 Accordingly, the court
found that pollution damage "manifests itself' when it reaches a
detectable and legally significant level in soil or groundwater. 5
Although the PCE contamination was not actually known or dis-
covered until after the policies expired, it may have been discov-
erable while they were in effect. 6 Even if the term was ambigu-
ous-meaning both "discoverable" and "discovered"--it had to be
interpreted to mean the former, to construe the policy in favor of
the insured.7
The court said that the allegations of the complaint fell within
the risk covered by the policy, leaving open the possibility that
the PCE contamination "first manifested itself' during the life of
the policies.7' Thus, Sentry had a duty to defend its insureds. 9
V. FIRE INSURANCE
Moorehead v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.8 ° arose from a
fire that occurred at the plaintiffs' residence.8 ' State Farm in-
sured the Mooreheads through a homeowner's policy. 2 After an
investigation, State Farm denied the Mooreheads' claim because
it believed that they had set the fire and that Mr. Moorehead had
concealed and misrepresented material facts about the loss by re-
fusing to answer certain questions during an examination under
oath.8 3
The Mooreheads sued for "bad faith" breach of the insurance
contract, claiming damages of $114,140. s4 They also sought per
diem damages of $100 for emotional harm, characterized as a
"loss of peace of mind" due to the denial of their claim. Addition-
74 Id. at 449 (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 450.
76. Id. at 450-51.
77. Id. at 452.
78. Id. at 454.
79. Id.
80. 123 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (W.D. Va. 2000).
81. Id. at 1005.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1005-06.
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ally, they asserted claims for expert witness fees and litigation
expenses.86 State Farm moved for partial summary judgment
with respect to these claimed damages.87
The court recognized that, while Virginia law does not allow
recovery in tort for a bad faith refusal to honor a first-party in-
surance claim, in some circumstances it might allow a plaintiff to
seek consequential damages above and beyond an insurance pol-
icy's limits.88 The Supreme Court of Virginia had not yet decided
"whether emotional harm is a proper basis for consequential dam-
ages in a contract action." 9
The court acknowledged that the supreme court had been re-
luctant to allow damages for emotional harm in contract actions.9"
The Supreme Court of Virginia held, however, that Virginia fol-
lows the rule set forth in the Restatement of Contracts, 9' which
says that "'damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily
allowed' in contract actions, except where the claim involves bod-
ily injury or where "'the contract or the breach is of such a kind
that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely re-
sult. , 9
2
The court agreed with this interpretation of Virginia law and
applied the restatement rule to the case. While the homeowner's
insurance policy was not the type of contract commonly associ-
ated with such harm, State Farm's alleged breach might have
been such that serious emotional disturbance was a likely re-
sult.94 The court reserved this question for trial.95
The court did, however, grant partial summary judgment as to
86. Id. at 1005.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1006 (citing A & E Supply Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d
669, 676, 678 (4th Cir. 1986)).
89. Id.
90. Id. For this proposition, the court cited Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. O'Neal, 224 Va.
343, 297 S.E.2d 647 (1982), where the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "'absent
some tort,' damages for 'humiliation or injury to feelings' are not recoverable in an action
for breach of contract." Id. at 354, 297 S.E.2d at 653 (citation omitted).
91. Moorehwad, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1006-07 (citing Wise v. Gen. Motors Corp., 588 F.
Supp. 1207 (W.D. Va. 1984)).
92. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981)).
93. Id. at 1007.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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the Mooreheads' claim for emotional harm calculated on a per
diem basis, finding that the calculations were inconsistent with
Virginia law because they were arbitrary estimations lacking evi-
dentiary support.96
Finally, the court denied the Mooreheads' motion for litigation
expenses." Virginia Code section 38.2-209(A) provides for the
award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees where "the court de-
termines that the insurer, not acting in good faith, has either de-
nied coverage or failed or refused to make payment to the insured
under the policy."" The court said that if the Mooreheads were to
win at trial, it would consider an award of costs according to the
evidence at trial.99
In Moorehead, the district court predicted that the Supreme
Court of Virginia would follow the restatement rule allowing re-
covery of damages for emotional harm in contract cases, while ac-
knowledging that it had been reluctant to do so.1°0 As a result,
consequential damages for emotional disturbance appear to be re-
coverable in almost all first-party insurance claims, regardless of
whether the insurance contract is the type commonly associated
with such harm. This is because insureds can argue that the
"breach was such that serious emotional disturbance was a par-
ticularly likely result."'
VI. LIFE INSURANCE
Mohamud v. Monumental Life Insurance Co.'°2 was the only
significant life insurance case decided in Virginia last year. In
that case, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia considered whether the insured's widow could re-
cover under group mortgage life insurance and accidental death
insurance policies.'0° Falhad Mohamud sued Monumental Life for
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1008.
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-209(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
99. Moorehead, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1008.
100. See id. at 1006-07.
101. Id. at 1007.
102. 138 F. Supp. 2d 709 (E.D. Va. 2001).
103. Id. at 712. The policies provided that the company would pay the outstanding bal-
ance on the insured's mortgage loan if either insured died. Id.
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breach of contract, alleging that it failed to pay a claim that re-
sulted when her husband, Abdullahi Mohamed, was shot in a cof-
fee shop in Mogadishu, Somalia, which was in a state of civil un-
rest at that time. °4
In accordance with Monumental Life's policies, Mohamud pro-
vided the company with a Somali death certificate as proof of
death.0 5 The insurer would not accept the certificate, however,
because it claimed that it could not verify its authenticity.' 6
Mohamud also produced many other requested items in support
of her claim, including a certificate from a physician stating the
cause of death, newspaper articles about her husband's death, her
husband's plane ticket information, affidavits from friends attest-
ing to how he died, and affidavits from people who attended his
funeral.' 7 Nonetheless, Monumental Life refused to pay on the
policies on the grounds that Mohamud produced no verifiable
proof of death.' 8 Monumental Life reached this conclusion be-
cause its investigators refused to go to Somalia to verify the proof
submitted by Mohamud. °9
After a bench trial, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia found that Mohamud submitted suffi-
cient preliminary proof of death and was entitled to recover under
the policies because the insured died by accidental means."' It
found that the documentation and the veracity of the uncontested
affiants demonstrated proof of loss under the policies."'
Monumental Life argued that, because the Somali death cer-
tificate was inadmissible as evidence, Mohamud had not fur-
nished sufficient admissible proof of death.12 The court disagreed,
stating that requiring Mohamud to submit a death certificate in a
form that the company required would impose an impossible con-
dition of recovery under the contract."' Neither the life nor the
accidental death insurance policies required that a government
104. Id. at 712-13.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 712.
107. Id. at 712-13.
108. Id. at 713.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 714.
111. Id. at 715.
112. Id. at 717.
113. Id. at 715.
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recognized by the United States certify the death certificate, and
Virginia law did not require the production of an admissible
death certificate." 4
The court said that Monumental Life could not make recovery
under its policies contingent on the ability of its investigators to
investigate proof of death."5 According to the court, "[e]ssentially,
Monumental Life state[d] that it could not secure its own investi-
gators to verify the proof of death in Somalia, and therefore, the
Insured [was] not entitled to recover under the policies. Such a
result is preposterous and unreasonable.""6
The court went on to hold that the preponderance of the evi-
dence showed that Mohamud was entitled to recover under the
policies because she met her burden of showing that the death
was accidental."7 For example, Mr. Eng Xasan Dhiisi testified
that he witnessed the insured's death, stating that he was ten
steps away from the insured after the shooting stopped and could
see that the insured was not breathing."' Furthermore, the court
found that, under the circumstances in Somalia, Monumental
Life did not meet its burden of showing that the insured died due
to an act of war."9 The court pointed out that "[i]f this Court were
to make such a finding, then any random shooting, even in this
country, could be deemed to have resulted from an act of war."2 °
The court denied Mohamud's request for attorney's fees, find-
ing that Monumental Life did not act in bad faith because it had
reason to question Mohamud's claim as she had been previously
been convicted of forgery.' 2'
VII. MISREPRESENTATION
Two cases on misrepresentation were decided last year. U.S.
114. Id. at 715-18.
115. Id. at 716.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 720.
119. Id. at 720-21.
120. Id. at 721.
121. Id. at 722 n.6. A court shall not award costs and attorney's fees unless the court
determines that the insurer did not act in good faith in refusing to pay a benefit to the in-
sured. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-209 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
2001]
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Specialty Insurance Co. v. Skymaster of Virginia122 was a declara-
tory judgment action in which U.S. Specialty sought to avoid cov-
erage of a pilot who misrepresented his medical condition to the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"). 23
Skymaster is a Virginia corporation that was formed to own a
1973 Cessna 3376 aircraft, which was insured by U.S. Spe-
cialty.'24 The policy covered property damage, personal injury li-
ability, and medical payments. 21 Mr. Poulin, an officer and share-
holder of Skymaster, crash-landed the plane on August 9, 1998,
injuring himself and several passengers, as well as damaging the
aircraft.'26 After the crash, FAA inspectors found Poulin's
prescription medication, including insulin, at the crash site. 27
During an examination under oath, Poulin refused to answer sev-
eral questions about his diabetic condition and his FAA medical
certificate by asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 1
28
During his deposition, Poulin said that he was diagnosed with
diabetes mellitus in 1987 and had suffered from the disease ever
since. 129 He went to Dr. Royer, an FAA Medical Examiner, to re-
new his FAA Medical Certificate in May 1996 and May 1998, but
he did not tell Royer about his condition. 3 ° He also failed to dis-
close this information on the renewal application forms, which
specifically asked whether the applicant suffered from diabetes.'3 '
122. 123 F. Supp. 2d 995 (E.D. Va. 2000).
123. Id. at 995.
124. Id. at 996.
125. Id. The policy stated as follows:
The aircraft must be operated in flight only by a person shown below, who
must have a current and proper (1) medical certificate and (2) pilot certificate
with necessary ratings required by the FAA for each flight. There is no cov-
erage under the policy if the pilot does not meet these requirements.
Id. at 998. Sections of the policy entitled "General Provisions and Conditions," "Aircraft
Physical Damage," and "Liability to Others" stated that no coverage existed under the pol-
icy unless this requirement was met. Id. at 998-99.
126. Id. at 996.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 996-97.
129. Id. at 997.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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Poulin was using either insulin or some other hypoglycemic drug
to control his diabetes on the day of the crash.'32
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that Poulin's medical certificate was not current
and proper due to his misrepresentations to Dr. Royer and on his
medical certificate renewal form. 33 The general medical stan-
dards for a third-class airman medical certificate included: '"No
established medical history or clinical diagnosis of diabetes melli-
tus that requires insulin or any other hypoglycemic drug for con-
trol.' ',"3 The court held that the policy's requirement of a proper
and current medical certificate was not satisfied by one "'granted
upon the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation.... Merely the
fact that it had not been canceled by the FAA does not make the
medical certificate valid.
1 35
The exclusion in the policy was permissible under Virginia
Code section 38.2-2227.'3' Skymaster argued that the statute only
provided an exclusion of coverage for failure to possess a pilot's
certificate, not a medical certificate. 37 The court said that FAA
regulations require that "'a person may not act as pilot in com-
mand or in any other capacity as a required pilot flight crew-
member of an aircraft, under a certificate issued to that person
under this part, unless that person has a current and appropriate
medical certificate.", 3' Thus, the requirement that a pilot possess
a proper and current medical certificate was clearly "relate[d] to"
the "[c]ertification of a pilot in a stated category by the Federal
132. Id.
133. Id. at 999.
134. Id. (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 67.313 (2001)).
135. Id. (quoting Ranger Ins. Co. v. Bowie, 574 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. 1978)).
136. Id. That statute provides as follows:
No insurance policy issued or delivered in this Commonwealth covering loss,
expense, or liability arising out of the loss, maintenance, or use of an aircraft
shall act to exclude or deny coverage because the aircraft is operated in viola-
tion of federal or civil regulations or any state or local ordinance. This sec-
tion does not prohibit the use of specific exclusions or conditions in any policy
that relates to any of the following:
2. Certification of a pilot in a stated category by the Federal Aviation
Administration.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2227 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cure. Supp. 2001).
137. Skymaster, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
138. Id. at 1002 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 61.3(c) (2001)).
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Aviation Administration."1 39 The court further held that a causal
connection between the lack of a proper medical certificate and
the crash was unnecessary to void the policy. 4 '
Finally, the injured passengers argued that U.S. Specialty
failed to give them proper notice of its intention to rely on a
breach of the terms or conditions of the policy.' Because Sky-
master filed the only claim under the policy, which was for dam-
age to the aircraft, and the passengers had filed a suit in state
court against Poulin and Skymaster but had not served them
with that action, the forty-five day notification period had not be-
gun to run, and U.S. Specialty had not waived any defense based
on Poulin's breach of the policy.'
The second case on misrepresentation, Commercial Underwrit-
ers Insurance Co. v. Hunt & Calderone, P.C., was a declaratory
judgment action involving coverage under a professional liability,
claims-made insurance policy.
On May 8, 1997, the insured accounting firm filed a renewal
application for professional liability insurance with Commercial
Underwriters Insurance Company ("CUIC").'" The next day, a
partner in the firm realized that she had missed a filing deadline
for one of their clients. 4 ' She knew that her error could result in
the client's loss of a $125,000 tax credit, but she did not think
that a claim would result because an administrator of the gov-
ernment tax credit program told her that enough money probably
would be available after the timely applications had been proc-
139. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2227 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001)).
140. Id. at 1002-03 (citing Holland Supply Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166
Va. 331, 335, 186 S.E. 56, 57 (1936) (stating that a causal connection is not required in a
contract action, as opposed to a tort action)).
141. Id. at 1003. The Virginia Code states:
Whenever any insurer on a policy of liability insurance discovers a breach of
the terms or conditions of the insurance contract by the insured, the insurer
shall notify the claimant or the claimant's counsel of the breach. Notification
shall be given within forty-five days after discovery by the insurer of the
breach or of the claim, whichever is later.... Failure to give the notice within
forty-five days will result in a waiver of the defense based on such breach to
the extent of the claim by operation of law.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2226 (Cum. Supp. 2001). For further discussion of Virginia Code
section 38.2-2226, see infra Part IX.
142. Skymaster, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
143. 261 Va. 38, 540 S.E.2d 491 (2001).
144. Id. at 40, 540 S.E.2d at 492.
145. Id.
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essed.'46 The client also was satisfied with these assurances. 47
The firm did not tell CUIC of the error while its insurance appli-
cation was pending.'"
After the policy became effective, the firm learned that suffi-
cient funds were not available for its client's tax credit.49 In Au-
gust 1997, the client told the firm that he would hold it responsi-
ble for the lost tax credit. 5 ' The firm filed a claim with CUIC,
which denied coverage and refused to provide a defense for the
firm in a subsequent action by the client.151
The trial court held that CUIC failed to meet its burden of
proof on the question of the materiality of the firm's misrepresen-
tation.'52 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, saying that the
only material evidence was the policy itself, which recited in boi-
lerplate language that the representations in the application were
material.'53 The court said, "[s]uch evidence is far from the clear
proof required to show that truthful answers would have rea-
sonably influenced CUIC's decision to issue the policy to [the
firmi .154
The policy contained a condition precedent and an exclusion
that involved a determination of whether the insured reasonably
anticipated that the error, made before the inception of the policy,
would result in a claim under the policy. 5 5 A partner of the firm
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 41, 540 S.E.2d at 492.
153. Id. at 43, 540 S.E.2d at 492. The Virginia Code states: "No statement in an appli-
cation [for an insurance policy] ... made before or after loss under the policy shall bar a
recovery upon a policy of insurance unless it is clearly proved that such answer or state-
ment was material to the risk when assumed and was untrue." See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
309 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
154. Commercial Underwriters, 261 Va. at 43, 540 S.E.2d at 493.
155. Id. at 43, 540 S.E.2d at 493-94. Section I.A.2 of the policy provided:
All of the following conditions must be satisfied before coverage will apply:
2. the Insured had no knowledge of such actual or alleged act, error, omis-
sion, circumstance or Personal Injury or otherwise had no basis to reasonable
[sic] anticipate a claim that would be insured by this Coverage Part at policy
inception.
Id. at 43 n.3, 540 S.E.2d at 494 n.3. Section II.A. of the policy, relating to exclusions, pro-
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testified that the error was not one that could reasonably be an-
ticipated to result in a claim because of the government adminis-
trator's assurances. 6 The client also testified that he believed
that the matter "would be okay."15 7 The court held that, faced
with this testimony, CUIC had to provide evidence that would
challenge the reasonableness of the firm's belief, but that CUIC
failed to satisfy that burden.'
VIII. MOTOR VEHICLE UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE
A. Definition of Insured
The Supreme Court of Virginia decided three cases pertaining
to UM/UIM insurance coverage since June 1, 2000. The most re-
cent case, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jones,'59 involved the issue of
whether a passenger was entitled to UM benefits under the
driver's insurance policy. 6° Marcellus D. Jones was injured while
riding in a car driven and owned by Christopher D. Robinson and
insured by Allstate. 6' Jones sued Robinson for negligence, but
during the pendency of the action, Allstate denied coverage to
Robinson due to his lack of cooperation.'62 Jones served Allstate
with process and obtained a judgment against Robinson. 163
Jones alleged that he became an uninsured motorist pursuant
to Virginia Code section 38.2-2206 when Allstate denied liability
coverage to Robinson and that Allstate was required to pay its
$25,000 UM insurance limit as partial satisfaction of Jones's
judgment.'64 The circuit court held, on summary judgment, that
vided: "any claim arising out of any actual or alleged act, error, omission, Personal Injury
or circumstance likely to give rise to a claim of which an Insured had knowledge, or oth-
erwise had reason to anticipate might result in a claim, prior to the inception of this pol-
icy." Id.
156. Id. at 44, 540 S.E.2d at 494.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 261 Va. 444, 544 S.E.2d 320 (2001).
160. Id. at 445, 544 S.E.2d at 321.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 446, 544 S.E.2d at 321.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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Allstate was obligated under Virginia Code section 38.2-2206 to
pay its UM policy limit.'65
On appeal, Allstate argued that because the UM endorsement
in its policy provided coverage to persons occupying insured mo-
tor vehicles, the question was whether Robinson's vehicle was an
"insured motor vehicle" when Jones served Allstate with proc-
ess. 166 Jones contended that he was an insured as defined by Vir-
ginia Code section 38.2-2206(B). 67
Applying the statutory definitions of "insured" and "uninsured
motor vehicle, the court held that Allstate was required to pay
the limit of its UM coverage toward Jones's judgment. 69 Once it
denied coverage to Robinson, the vehicle met the statutory defini-
tion of an uninsured motor vehicle, thereby precluding payment
on the liability coverage.7 ° The court therefore held that Jones, a
passenger in the car at the time of the accident, was an insured
165. Id.
166. Id. at 446, 544 S.E.2d at 321-22.
167. Id. at 446, 544 S.E.2d at 322.
168. The court cited the following:
A.... [N]o policy or contract of bodily injury or property damage liability in-
surance relating to the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle
shall be issued or delivered in this Commonwealth to the owner of such vehi-
cle or shall be issued or delivered by any insurer licensed in this Common-
wealth upon any motor vehicle principally garaged or used in this Common-
wealth unless it contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay
the insured all sums that he is legally entitled to recover as damages from
the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle....
B .... "Insured" as used in subsections A, D, G, and H of this section means
the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of
the named insured, and relatives, wards or foster children of either, while in
a motor vehicle or otherwise, and any person who uses the motor vehicle to
which the policy applies, with the expressed or implied consent of the named
insured, and a guest in the motor vehicle to which the policy applies or the
personal representative of any of the above.
"Uninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle for which (i) there is no bod-
ily injury liability insurance and property damage liability insurance in the
amounts specified by § 46.2-472, (ii) there is such insurance but the insurer
writing the insurance denies coverage for any reason whatsoever, including
failure or refusal of the insured to cooperate with the insurer.
Id. at 447, 544 S.E.2d at 322 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A)-(B) (Cum. Supp.
2001)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 448, 544 S.E.2d at 322 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Cum. Supp.
2001) (providing that an uninsured motor vehicle means a motor vehicle for which there is
insurance, "but the insurer writing the insurance denies coverage for any reason whatso-
ever, including failure or refusal of the insured to cooperate with the insurer")).
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within the meaning of Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B) because
he was a guest in the motor vehicle.17'
Allstate argued that, as a condition precedent to UM coverage,
there must be both an insured motor vehicle and an uninsured
motor vehicle. 7 1 It relied upon Superior Insurance Co. v.
Hunter 73 for the proposition that an automobile cannot be
deemed both "an insured motor vehicle and an uninsured motor
vehicle." 74 In rejecting Allstate's argument, the court distin-
guished Superior from Jones.'75 In Superior, the court held that
the UIM provisions of a tortfeasor's policy could not be used to
satisfy claims of passengers who were insureds under the same
policy and whose claims exceeded the limits of the liability cover-
age."' 6 There was no possibility, however, that Allstate could be
required to pay its contracted limits of liability coverage and also
pay UIM coverage from the same policy because Jones only
sought recovery under the UM provisions. 77
B. Judgment Against Insurer
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hylton,17 the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered whether, in a tort action, a judgment
could be entered against an insurance company that was not a
party to the suit.179 Clarence E. Hylton sued Mark Daniel DeHart,
a Virginia State Trooper, alleging that he was injured by
DeHart's negligent operation of a motor vehicle.8 ° Robert C. Wet-
zel, registered agent for Nationwide and Hylton's insurer, re-
ceived a copy of the motion for judgment.'8 ' DeHart filed both a
grounds of defense and a plea of sovereign immunity, asserting
171. Id. at 448, 544 S.E.2d at 322-23.
172. Id. at 446, 544 S.E.2d at 322.
173. 258 Va. 338, 520 S.E.2d 646 (1999).
174. Jones, 261 Va. at 446, 544 S.E.2d at 322.
175. Id. at 450, 544 S.E.2d at 324.
176. Superior Ins. Co., 258 Va. at 344-45, 520 S.E.2d at 649.
177. Jones, 261 Va. at 450, 544 S.E.2d at 324.
178. 260 Va. 56, 530 S.E.2d 421 (2000).
179. Id. at 59, 530 S.E.2d at 422.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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that he decided to apprehend a traffic violator and was determin-
ing how to proceed when the accident occurred.'82
The circuit court sustained the plea of sovereign immunity on
the morning of trial and allowed Hylton to proceed with his law-
suit against Nationwide.'83 Nationwide, however, was not a party
to the action and had not filed any pleadings." Further, DeHart's
lawyer told the court that "he did not represent Nationwide."'
The jury found in favor of Hylton, and the circuit court con-
firmed the $100,000 verdict.' After learning of the judgment,
Nationwide asked the court to set it aside because it was not a
named party to the suit.187 When the circuit court took no action
on the motion, Nationwide appealed the judgment. 8
The supreme court held that the circuit court erred by entering
a judgment against Nationwide. 8 9 In prior cases the supreme
court had held that "a plaintiff who files a tort action for injuries
caused by an owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle
cannot recover a judgment in that action against" the UM car-
rier.' 90 The court also stated that although Virginia Code section
38.2-2206(F)' 91 gave Nationwide the right to participate in the
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 59-60, 530 S.E.2d at 422.
187. Id. at 60, 530 S.E.2d at 422.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 61, 530 S.E.2d at 423.
190. Id. The court relied on the following language:
"This is not an action arising ex contractu to recover against the insurance
company on its endorsement. The insurance company is not a named party
defendant and judgment cannot be entered against it in this action. This is
an action ex delicto, since the cause of action arises out of a tort, and the only
issues presented are the establishment of legal liability on the unknown un-
insured motorist, John Doe, and the fixing of damages, if any."
Id. (quoting Doe v. Brown, 203 Va. 508, 515, 125 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1962)).
The court went on to hold that, to the contrary, "the question whether an automobile
insurance company has a legal obligation to a plaintiff "may be decided in an action ex
contractu brought on the policy by the interested judgment plaintiff, or in a declaratory
judgment proceeding to determine the rights of the parties." Id. (citing Rodgers v. Danko,
204 Va. 140, 143, 129 S.E.2d 828, 830 (1963)).
191. The Virginia Code provides that in any UM or UIM action, the insured must serve
a copy of the process on his insurer, as though it were a party defendant. The insurer then
has the right to file pleadings and take other action in the name of the owner or operator
of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or in its own name. See VA. CODE ANN. §
20011
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case, it does not allow Hylton to obtain a judgment against Na-
tionwide.'92 The court held that "the fact that Nationwide's regis-
tered agent received a copy of the motion for judgment d[id] not
permit the circuit court to enter a judgment against Nation-
wide." 93
C. Rejection of Additional Coverage
Finally, in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Hall,'94 the
Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the issue of whether an in-
sured effectively waived the maximum UM coverage for her policy
mandated by Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(A). 195
The insured bought the policy in 1974, and on or around July 1
of each subsequent year, Government Employees Insurance
Company ("GEICO") mailed her a "Renewal Solicitation Pack-
age," including a waiver form allowing her to reduce the amount
of her UM coverage.' 96 The waiver form clearly stated that the in-
sured "was required to return [it] within 20 days in order to select
the lower uninsured motorist insurance coverage."' 97 The insured
executed the waiver included in the 1991 renewal package and
reduced her coverage from $300,000 to $30,000 per per-
sonl$60,000 per occurrence.' 98 Even though the insured's husband
was also a "named insured" under the policy and did not endorse
the waiver form, GEICO nevertheless honored the waiver and re-
duced the UM coverage and the policy premium.'99
The insured received the 1992 renewal package at the begin-
ning of July of that year, but she failed to execute the waiver form
38.2-2206(F) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
192. Hylton, 260 Va. at 61, 530 S.E.2d at 423.
193. Id.
194. 260 Va. 349, 533 S.E.2d 615 (2000).
195. Id. at 351, 533 S.E.2d at 615.
196. Id. at 352, 533 S.E.2d at 615-16. The amount of the UM coverage was "otherwise
statutorily mandated to equal the amount of bodily injury liability coverage provided by
the policy." Id. at 352, 533 S.E.2d at 616. Under VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A) (Cum.
Supp. 2001), the limits of UM coverage "shall equal but not exceed the limits of the liabil-
ity insurance provided by the policy, unless any one named insured rejects the additional
uninsured motorist insurance coverage by notifying the insurer as provided in subsection
B of§ 38.2-2202."Id.
197. Hall, 260 Va. at 352, 533 S.E.2d at 616.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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until August 12, 1992.20 Even though the insured failed to exe-
cute waiver forms after 1992, "GEICO continued to provide unin-
sured motorist insurance coverage at the reduced rate."2° '
Five years later, the insured's daughter died as a result of a
motor vehicle accident. °2 At the time the daughter resided with
her mother and was therefore a "person insured" under the
GEICO policy.203 The administrators of the daughter's estate sued
the driver of the car in which she was riding, as well as "John
Doe," the driver of the vehicle who allegedly caused the acci-
dent.0 4 The administrators also filed a declaratory judgment ac-
tion against GEICO, seeking a determination of whether the es-
tate was entitled to the maximum uninsured motorist insurance
coverage of "$300,000, rather than the $30,000 stated in the pol-
icy. 205
Upon finding that the 1991 and 1992 waivers were ineffec-
tive,06 the trial court required GEICO to provide the maximum
UM coverage of $300,000.201
The supreme court reversed, holding that "the trial court erred
in ruling that the time limit contained in [Virginia Code section
38.2-2202(B)] applied to renewal notices sent to [the insured]."2°s
It noted that Virginia Code section 38.1-380.2(B), the predecessor
to section 38.2-2202(B), "explicitly provided a notice applicable to
each 'new or renewal policy... and... original or renewal pre-
mium notice.' 20 9 The court said that the terms "renewal policy"
200. Id. Because the insured's husband had died, her signature was the only one re-
quired on the waiver form. Id.
20L Id. at 352-53, 533 S.E.2d at 616.
202. Id. at 352, 533 S.E.2d at 615.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 353, 533 S.E.2d at 616.
205. Id.
206. The 1991 waiver was invalid because the insured's husband, also a named in-
sured, did not sign the waiver as required by statute. Id. The 1992 waiver was invalid be-
cause the insured did not return it to GEICO within twenty days. Id. at 354, 533 S.E.2d at
617.
207. Id. GEICO conceded on appeal that the 1991 waiver was invalid, since the then-
applicable provisions of Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(A) required that each named in-
sured had to reject the statutorily mandated amount of UM coverage for a waiver to be
valid, and the insured's husband did not sign the waiver. Id. at 353 n.4, 533 S.E.2d at 616
n.4; see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weisman, 247 Va. 199, 203, 441 S.E.2d 16, 19
(1994).
208. Hall, 260 Va. at 355, 533 S.E.2d at 617-18 (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 355, 533 S.E.2d at 617 (alteration in original).
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and "renewal premium notice" were "conspicuously absent" from
Virginia Code section 38.2-2202(B).21 ° Thus, it applied the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius-the expression of one thing
is the exclusion of the other.21' Also, the final paragraph of Vir-
ginia Code section 38.2-2202(B) "expressly permits an insurance
company to exclude the notice from a 'renewal policy.' 212
The court went on to find that the twenty-day limit stated in
the waiver form, although not required by Virginia Code section
38.2-2202(B), did not bind GEICO.2 3 Looking at the course of
dealing between the parties, the court found that this time limit
"was not an essential term of the contract, and thus, could be
waived by GEICO."" 4 Furthermore, the actions of the insured as
well as GEICO "were consistent with an agreement for the lower
amount of uninsured motorist insurance coverage."2 5 The court
stated that "[b]oth parties received what they bargained for: a re-
duced premium in exchange for reduced insurance coverage."2"6
Accordingly, it held that the 1992 waiver was effective to reduce
the amount of the insured's UM coverage and that the waiver was
effective at the time of the accident.217
This holding is particularly important to insurance coverage
counsel because it relaxes the requirements for insureds to reduce
their UM/UIM coverage. The case makes clear that Virginia Code
section 38.2-2202(B) only affects notices applicable to new poli-
cies, not renewal policies. 2" This means that once an insured re-
duces his UM/UIM coverage, it is effectively reduced for the life of
the policy without the need for any further notice by the carrier.
Moreover, the case shows that even if the carrier sends its in-
sured a waiver form, any time limit contained therein will not
bind the insurer if the course of dealing between the parties and
their subsequent actions show that it was not an essential term of
the contract.2 9
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2202(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
213. Hall, 260 Va. at 355, 533 S.E.2d at 618.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 356, 533 S.E.2d at 618.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 355, 533 S.E.2d at 617.
219. Id.
INSURANCE LAW
D. Statutory Changes
The 2001 General Assembly made several changes to Virginia's
insurance statutes-Title 38.2 of the Virginia Code.22° The first
amendment affected Virginia Code section 38.2-2202, which re-
quires new motor vehicle liability policies to notify insureds that
the amount of their UM!UIM coverage will automatically increase
to the limits of their liability coverage if they have purchased
more liability insurance than is required by law.221 The notice
also must advise insureds that they may notify their agent or in-
surer that they want to reduce coverage within twenty days of the
mailing of the policy or premium notice.222 House Bill 2801 added
220. Despite the many changes, only the three statutory amendments that will likely
affect insurance law practitioners will be discussed.
221. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2202(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001). Subsection B provides as fol-
lows:
B. No new policy or original premium notice of insurance covering liability
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall
be issued or delivered unless it contains the following statement printed in
boldface type, or unless the statement is attached to the front of or is enclosed
with the policy or premium notice:
IMPORTANT NOTICE
IN ADDITION TO THE INSURANCE COVERAGE REQUIRED BY LAW
TO PROTECT YOU AGAINST A LOSS CAUSED BY AN UNINSURED
MOTORIST, IF YOU HAVE PURCHASED LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE THAT IS HIGHER THAN THAT REQUIRED BY LAW TO
PROTECT YOU AGAINST LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF THE
OWNERSHIP, MAINTENANCE, OR USE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES
COVERED BY THIS POLICY, AND YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY
PURCHASED UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE COVERAGE
EQUAL TO YOUR LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE:
1. YOUR UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE
COVERAGE HAS INCREASED TO THE LIMITS OF YOUR LIABILITY
COVERAGE AND THIS INCREASE WILL COST YOU AN EXTRA
PREMIUM CHARGE; AND
2. YOUR TOTAL PREMIUM CHARGE FOR YOUR MOTOR VEHICLE
INSURANCE COVERAGE WILL INCREASE IF YOU DO NOT NOTIFY
YOUR AGENT OR INSURER OF YOUR DESIRE TO REDUCE COVERAGE
WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THE MAILING OF THE POLICY OR THE
PREMIUM NOTICE, AS THE CASE MAY BE.
3. IF THIS IS A NEW POLICY AND YOU HAVE ALREADY SIGNED A
WRITTEN REJECTION OF SUCH HIGHER LIMITS IN CONNECTION
WITH IT, PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THIS NOTICE DO NOT APPLY.
Id.
222. Id.
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a provision allowing an insurer to require any request to reduce
this increased UMIUIM coverage to be in writing.223
The UM insurance coverage section, Virginia Code section 38.2-
2206, was also revised.224 Subsection G provides, among other
things, that an insurer that pays a claim to its insured under its
UM endorsement is subrogated to the insured's rights against the
owner or operator of the uninsured vehicle.225 It also states that,
to the extent that the insurer paid the named insured in an ac-
tion against the owner or operator as a "John Doe," any recovery
in an action against the owner or operator, or his insurer (after
their identity has become known), must be paid to the injured
226party's insurer. 6 House Bill 1939 also amended Virginia Code
section 38.2-2206 to provide that "In]o action, verdict or release
arising out of a suit brought under this subsection shall give rise
to any defenses in any other action brought in the subrogated
party's name, including res judicata and collateral estoppel."227
IX. WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
The 2001 General Assembly also amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 38.2-2226.228 This statute requires insurers to give notice to
claimants of their intention to rely on any defenses arising from
the insured's breach of the terms or conditions of the insurance
policy.229 The only time limitation that the statute previously im-
posed was that the "Inlotification shall be given within forty-five
days after discovery by the insurer of the breach or of the claim,
223. H.B. 2801, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 23, 2001,
ch. 564, 2001 Va. Acts 662) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2202 (Cum.
Supp. 2001)). At the end of paragraph number two of the notice, the policy must state,
'THE INSURER MAY REQUIRE THAT SUCH A REQUEST TO REDUCE COVERAGE
BE IN WRITING." Id.
224. See H.B. 1939, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 14,
2001, ch. 218, 2001 Va. Acts 181) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206
(Cum. Supp. 2001)).
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(G) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. H.B. 2424, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 26, 2001,
ch. 728, 2001 Va. Acts 990) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2226 (Cum.
Supp. 2001)).
229. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2226 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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whichever is later."23' The previous version of Virginia Code sec-
tion 38.2-2226 also stated that notice of the execution of a non-
waiver of rights agreement by the insurer and the insured, or the
issuance of a reservation of rights letter, must be given to the
claimant or his counsel within the same time frame.23'
House Bill 2424, however, places a new time constraint upon
insurers intending to rely on their insured's breach of the policy
as a defense to coverage.232 The bill amended the section to read:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, in any claim in which
a civil action has been filed by the claimant, the insurer shall give
notice of reservation of rights in writing to the claimant, or if the
claimant is represented by counsel, to claimant's counsel not less
than thirty days prior to the date set for trial of the matter. The
court, upon motion of the insurer and for good cause shown, may al-
low such notice to be given fewer than thirty days prior to the trial
date. Failure to give the notice within thirty days of the trial date, or
such shorter period as the court may have allowed, shall result in a
waiver of the defense based on such breach to the extent of the claim
by operation of law.
233
As a result, insurers now have an outside time limit within
which to notify claimants of any defense arising from the in-
sured's breach of the policy.234 Even if the breach is discovered
within thirty days before trial, the insurer will have waived any
defense arising therefrom unless the court allows the required
notice to be given closer to trial. 5
X. CONCLUSION
For the most part, the cases decided since June 1, 2000 have
changed Virginia insurance law only modestly. As discussed,
however, two cases have made substantial changes and are ex-
pected to have a significant impact on this area of the law. Under
Moorehead v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 236 plaintiffs appar-
230. Id. § 38.2-2226 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
231. Id.
232. Va. H.B. 2424.
233. Id.
234. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2226 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
235. See id.
236. 123 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (W.D. Va. 2000).
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ently can seek consequential damages for emotional disturbance
in all first-party insurance claims.2 7 Also, GEICO v. Hall 23" eased
the requirements for insureds to reduce their UMIUIM cover-
age.2 This holding certainly will benefit insurance companies
seeking to limit their exposure under the UMIUIM provisions of
their policies.
237. See supra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
238. 260 Va. 349, 533 S.E.2d 615 (2000).
239. See supra notes 194-219 and accompanying text.
